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Abstract 
 
This contribution discusses the effects of new experiments of citizen 
participation for democratic legitimacy. Following Scharf’s distinction 
between input-oriented and output-oriented legitimacy, it is argued that both 
types of legitimacy pose different demands on citizen involvement. Using 
insights from the literature on deliberative democracy, two criteria are 
formulated to obtain both types of legitimacy. Input-oriented legitimacy 
derives from the extent to which the participative process meets the criterion of 
fairness, whereas a high level of competence is needed to achieve legitimacy 
on the output side. The question is to what extent these two criteria of fairness 
and competence can be realised simultaneously. It is argued that both criteria 
are rather conflictual, as a high level of fairness can only be achieved at the 
expense of the level of competence. Furthermore it is a rather naive ideal to 
strive for participative processes that completely live up to the principle of 
fairness. Therefore new forms of citizen participation should primarily focus 
on the criterion of competence. In this way citizen involvement may indeed 
contribute to achieve legitimacy on the output side.     
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
During the 1990’s citizen participation was internationally brought back on the 
agenda of political science, as well as the administrative practice. Numerous 
experiments have taken place in which citizens and other stakeholders gained 
access to policy arenas to influence political decision-making in an early stage 
(see for example Schaap en Daems, 2003; Denters et al, 2003; Barnes, 1999; 
Lowndes, et al, 2001; Button and Mattson, 1999). In the Netherlands these 
experiments were usually labelled ‘interactive governance’, or ‘interactive 
policy-making’. Advocates of interactive governance have more than once put 
forward the claim that interaction is a source of democratic legitimacy. In this 
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contribution this claim is being discussed. In our discussion Scharpf’s 
distinction between input-oriented and output-oriented legitimacy will be used. 
According to Scharpf (1997; 1999) democratic legitimacy is a two- 
dimensional concept, which refers to both the inputs as well as the outputs of a 
political system. On the input side democratic legitimacy requires mechanisms 
or procedures to link political decisions with citizens’ preferences. In modern 
democracies these mechanisms are reflected in representative institutions in 
which political decision-makers can be held accountable by the means of 
elections. On the other hand, Scharpf argues, democracy would be an ‘empty 
ritual’ if the democratic procedure was not able to produce effective outcomes, 
that is: ‘achieving the goals that citizens collectively care about’ (1997: 19). 
In this contribution the following question will be answered: can interactive 
governance contribute to democratic legitimacy on the input side as well as the 
output side?  
In the next section the concept of interactive governance is further outlined, as 
well as its supporting arguments. It will be argued that interactive governance 
is a form of deliberative democracy. Deliberation between several stakeholders 
may contribute to democratic legitimacy when two criteria are met. These 
criteria – fairness and competence – are examined in section 3. Both criteria 
refer to a specific type of legitimacy. In order to achieve input- oriented 
legitimacy the criterion of fairness should be satisfied, whereas a high level of 
competence is needed to achieve legitimacy on the output side. Furthermore it 
will be outlined that the principles of fairness and competence are rather 
conflictual, and cannot be obtained simultaneously. Therefore a trade-off must 
be made in which the principle of competence dominates at the expense of the 
criterion of fairness. In this way interactive governance is more likely to 
contribute to output-oriented legitimacy, rather than legitimacy on the input 
side. 
 
2. The rise of interactive governance: in search for democratic legitimacy 
 
The rise of interactive governance might be seen as a reaction to two social 
developments. First, the many experiments of citizen involvement can be 
placed in a revived interest in democratic reform. In the beginning of the 
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1990’s the idea gained ground that a cleavage had grown between citizens and 
their government, resulting in apathy within the citizenry. Traditional 
representative institutions could not cope with social changes resulting from 
increased social pluriformity and ongoing processes of individualisation (see 
Klingemann and Fuchs, 1995). Therefore new institutional arrangements have 
been developed to solve this ‘democratic deficit’.  
Second, social developments have led to an increased complexity of social 
problems. Modern society would be dominated by various social networks in 
which complex interdependencies prevail between actors who had always 
functioned rather independently (see Castells, 1996). As a consequence a shift 
of balance took place in which the realms of government and society got 
blurred. The government had grown to be merely a party among all others (see 
Nelissen, 1992), and had grown to be dependent on the resources of economic 
and social actors. These developments have resulted in new ideas about policy- 
making in which hierarchical structures are replaced by rather horizontal 
modes of cooperation between governmental and social actors (see for 
example Kooiman, 1993). To improve the quality of the content of policy and 
because of the recourses the government needed those other parties were more 
involved in the policy-making.  
However, the access to policy arenas was not limited only to collective parties 
like social and private organisations. More and more the idea gained ground 
that also individual citizens could contribute to improve the quality of policy- 
making in a complex society (see for example Quinlivan, 2001). Not only is 
the direct participation of citizens considered to be an effective tool for 
resolving public conflict (Dukes, 1996), but the involvement of citizens in 
policy-making could also prevent political decisions from resistance. Due to 
individualization citizens have become more critical towards their government 
(Norris, 1999). In order to lower this criticism, and to prevent decisions from 
resistance, administrators have become more willing to organize citizen 
participation in order to acquire the public support that is necessary to 
implement policy effectively (Ethridge, 1987; Cupps, 1977; Rosenbaum, 
1978).  All these forms of cooperative policy-making are captured in the term 
‘interactive governance’.  
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Proponents of interactive governance argue that interaction between 
various actors is an important source of legitimacy. On the one hand the direct 
participation of citizens in political decision–making could be seen as a 
mechanism to link political decisions with citizens’ preferences. On the other 
hand the involvement of citizens could generate better or more effective 
political outcomes. Using Scharpf’s terminology; the introduction of 
interactive governance is to be seen as an attempt to improve legitimacy on the 
input side as well as the output side.  
 
Interactive governance and input – oriented legitimacy                                                                          
Legitimacy on the input side depends on mechanisms  that translate the ‘will of 
the people’ into political decisions. If those mechanisms are judged by the 
people as ‘democratic’ or ‘good’, then there is input legitimacy. Examples of 
these mechanisms can be found in representative institutions, of which 
elections and party competition are considered to be most important (see Dahl, 
1971; Powell, 2000). Elections are instruments - or mechanisms - of 
democracy to the degree that they give the people influence over policy- 
making (Powell, 2000: 3). However, advocates of public participation argue 
that electoral institutions are insufficient instruments of democracy, as they do 
not succeed in providing real opportunities for citizens to effectively influence 
policy-making (see Budge, 1996). Following social choice theorists like 
Wiliam Riker (1982), it is often argued that voting is ambiguous because 
electoral outcomes do not necessarily reflect  ‘the popular will’, as they are 
merely artefacts of the procedures by which votes are counted (see Knight and 
Johnson, 1994). Furthermore, according to some social theorists, no single 
voting procedure succeeds in producing outcomes that completely represent 
the ‘will of the people’ (Riker, 1982; Powell, 2000). It is therefore proposed 
that deliberative democracy gives directions for democratic reform in which 
deliberation is the central mechanism to link political decisions with citizens’ 
preferences. In this respect the introduction of interactive modes of governance 
is to be seen as an attempt to improve input legitimacy.                                                                           
Advocates of interactive governance provide several arguments to support 
their claim that deliberation is an important source for input-oriented 
democratic legitimacy. First, and foremost, participative democrats argue that 
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representative institutions cannot live up to their expectations of democratic 
citizenship (Pateman, 1970; Barber, 1984; Budge, 1996). Deriving from a 
Rousseaunian, or populistic idea of democracy, these scholars look for changes 
in the structures of politics to widen citizen involvement in order to arrive at a 
democratic system which lives up to the Athenian ideal of direct democracy. 
For them, a ‘strong democracy’ refers to a political system of ‘self government 
by citizens rather than representative government in the name of citizens’ 
(Barber, 1984). Only in such a ‘strong democracy’ could the normative 
principles of sovereignty of the people and political equality prevail (see also 
Rosenbaum, 1978). In this light it is said that direct participation of citizens 
could lead to a cohesive society in which social exclusion is reduced 
(according to Barnes, 1999; 2002).  
Furthermore advocates of direct public participation often state that when 
citizens are involved in a deliberative process between legislators and other 
citizens they will be engaged in a learning process, in which they can validate 
their own preferences by confronting their perceptions with those of others. 
(see Fishkin, 1991; Elster, 1998; Barnes, 1999; Button and Mattson, 1999). In 
this perspective, the engagement of citizens in a deliberative process could 
enhance an enlighten citizenry.   
 
Interactive governance and legitimacy on the output side 
As was outlined above, many arguments can be found in the literature 
sustaining the claim that interaction in policy-making can improve input- 
oriented legitimacy. Stemming from the literature on participative democracy 
and deliberative democracy, these arguments are mostly normative by nature. 
However, also more pragmatic reasons can be given to provide opportunities 
for citizens to participate in policy-making processes. These pragmatic, or 
instrumental arguments are directed to legitimacy on the output side. 
According to Scharpf legitimacy on the output side exists to the extent 
government performance is effective, that is, the extent to which the system 
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satisfies the basic functions of government.1 However, Scharpf is not very 
clear in what these ‘basic functions of government’ exactly are.   
According to Scharpf ‘satisfying the basic functions of government’ refers to 
extent that democratic procedures are able to effectively promote the common 
welfare of the constituency in question (1999: 6), as well as ‘achieving the 
goals citizens collectiveley care about’ (1997: 19). As a consequence, output- 
oriented legitimacy has both an ‘objective’ and a ‘subjective’ component. 
The objective component refers to the extent that policy outcomes succeed in 
effectively solving social problems. In this light it is often stated in the 
literature that the direct participation of citizens and other stakeholders in the 
policy- making process produces better and ‘more intelligent’ outcomes (see 
Pröpper and Steenbeek, 1999; Kooiman, 1993; Barnes, 1999; Lowndes, 
Pratchett and Stoker, 2001; Edelenbos and Monnikhof, 1998; 2001; Hendriks 
and Tops, 2001). This assumption is based on the idea that in the modern 
network society ‘no single actor, public or private, has all knowledge and 
information required to solve complex dynamic and diversified problems’ 
(Kooiman, 1993). By giving citizens and other stakeholders access to the 
policy arena, administrators can use their expertise and information, which is 
needed to solve complex social issues.    
The ‘subjective’ component of output legitimacy refers to the extent that 
citizens are satisfied with the content of government policy. This is likely to be 
the case if people reach their own goals and recognize their preferences in 
political decisions (Potman, 1989; Hoekema e.a., 1998).  It is argued that 
interactive processes will bring the content of policy more into line with the 
preferences of citizens and that this will contribute to a positive judgement of 
these citizens about the content of the policy (see for example Edelenbos and 
Monnikhof, 2001).  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 In the literature usually a distinction is made between legitimacy and state effectiveness, or 
state performance (see Lipset, 1958)  Yet in practice there is a connection between 
effectiveness and legitimacy, as the performance of government makes a significant 
contribution to its legitimacy (Beetham, 1991). 
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Interactive government on both the input- and the output side 
Although Scharpf’s distinction between ‘input-oriented’ and ‘output-oriented’ 
legitimacy helps us to shed more light on the concept of democratic 
legitimacy, it should be emphasised here that both types of legitimacy are 
extremely interrelated. Output legitimacy derives from the effectiveness of 
government policy. However, effectiveness has only a meaning in relation to 
the preferences of citizens. In order to create effective outcomes procedures or 
mechanisms are therefore needed to track down these preferences and to 
translate them into political decisions.   
As was mentioned above, interactive procedures may help to link preferences 
of citizens to political decisions. Administrators and politicians can use the 
insights and information provided by citizens in order to improve the 
effectiveness of the policy decisions. The more this information is used, the 
higher the chance that the goals of these citizens are reached, and hence the 
higher the chance that outcomes will be effective. In this light, Tops (1999, 
pp.210-211) argues that a good interactive procedure is necessary to be 
successful in terms of the content of the policy, but that the quality of this 
procedure is not sufficient in itself for success. In other words: input 
legitimacy is needed to know what the preferences of people are, but this is not 
a guarantee for legitimacy on the output side.  
 
3. Fairness and competence 
 
In the previous section it was argued that the rise of interactive governance 
could be viewed as a reaction to two social developments. Firstly, interactive 
governance is a direction of democratic reform that could ‘cure’ the 
democratic deficit through the direct participation of citizens in political 
decision-making. Secondly, in the complex modern society knowledge of 
social issues is too dispersed to be solved by one single actor. Interactive 
governance could therefore be viewed as a form of network-steering. The first 
view emphasises legitimacy on the input side, whereas the latter focuses on 
output-oriented legitimacy. The question is, however, in what way processes of 
interactive governance should be organised in order to make a contribution to 
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legitimacy on both the input- and output side. An answer to this question may 
be found in the literature on deliberative democracy. 
 
Habermas’ ideal speech situation 
The visions of deliberative democrats are broadly inspired by Jürgen 
Habermas’ theory of communicative action (1970; 1981). The core idea of this 
theory holds that no objective reality exists, but that reality is socially 
constructed through shared perceptions and definitions about what is ‘real’. In 
other words: people collectively create a reality of their own in a 
communicative process in which people confront their arguments with those of 
others. In order to create an ‘ideal speech situation’ Habermas argues that 
communicative action should be oriented toward intersubjective 
understanding. This is what Habermas calls ‘communicative rationality’, 
which refers to the extent which communicative action is characterised by the 
reflective understanding of competent actors. Furthermore, the ideal speech 
situation should be free from strategic behaviour and domination through the 
exercise of power. This means that all actors should be equally and fully 
capable of making arguments.  
Habermas’s concept of the ideal speech situation has had a tremendous 
influence on the literature on deliberative democracy (see for example Dryzek, 
1990; 2000; Webler, 1995; Barnes, 2002; Akkerman, 2002). Deliberative 
democracy refers to a specific form of public participation consisting of fair 
procedures in which competent political and public actors engage in reasoned 
arguments for the purpose of collective decision-making.  
To be fair, deliberative procedures should provide equal opportunities for all 
relevant stakeholders to participate in the deliberative process, as well as equal 
opportunities to influence the outcomes of these processes (Webler, 1995; 
Knight and Johnson, 1994, Blaug, 1996). Furthermore, deliberative processes 
should produce successful outcomes. Therefore a certain level of competence 
is required, which refers to ‘the ability to use language to create understanding 
and agreement’ (Habermas, 1970). Deliberation between stakeholders in the 
policy-making process is often seen as an important source of legitimacy to the 
extent that such a process satisfies the criteria of fairness and competence.  
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As was outlined above, the rise of interactive governance may be seen as a 
search for more legitimacy on the input, as well as on the output side. 
Furthermore, processes of interactive governance entail deliberation between 
political and private actors, and may therefore be seen as a form of deliberative 
democracy. Therefore processes of interactive policy-making can be viewed 
legitimate to the extent these processes meet the criteria of fairness and 
competence. In the next section the question is answered in what way both 
criteria may enhance legitimacy. 
 
Fairness and input-oriented legitimacy 
In section 2 it was outlined why proponents of interactive governance often 
state that the direct participation of citizens and other stakeholders in policy-
making may enhance legitimacy on the input side. According to these scholars 
interactive policy-making is to be seen as a mechanism to link citizens’ 
preferences with the content of public policy. Furthermore interaction in 
policy-making could reduce social exclusion. 
In order to produce these desired effects, interactive policy processes should 
satisfy the criterion of fairness, which means that all stakeholders should have 
an equal chance ‘to be heard’. This means that interactive processes should be 
organised in such a manner that citizens not only have an equal chance to gain 
access to the interactive process, but also that opportunities to exercise 
influence are distributed equally among all participants.   
This does not mean, however, that all participants should equally succeed in 
translating their preferences into collective decisions. In a fair debate 
participants deliberate on an equal basis, that is, power positions should not 
determine whether an argument is considered to be valuable (see among others 
Dryzek, 1990; 2000). Fairness does not mean that bad arguments should 
prevail over good arguments. In this sense it is inevitable that certain 
participants exercise more influence than others. From the perspective of 
fairness this should not be considered a problem, as long as the best argument 
prevails. In this way a fair debate might lead to enlighten understanding among 
the participants, and hence create more equality, as equality also means that 
citizens should have an equal and adequate opportunity to validate their own 
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preferences, even if this means discovering that their preferences are not in 
their own interests.   
 
It would be rather naive to believe that every stakeholder is willing and able to 
put his valuable time and energy in participating in policy-making. Most 
stakeholders are therefore only willing to participate in processes considering 
their personal interests (Fiorina, 1999). Next to this in practice it is sometimes 
not possible to invite every stakeholder, because the amount of participants 
would be too large. For these reasons the principle of fairness is to be 
translated in the notion of representativeness. An interactive process is 
considered to be fair if the group of participants is representative to the total 
population of stakeholders. If this is not the case, sectoral interests are likely to 
dominate the policy-making process at the expense of the interests of the 
underrepresented. Therefore the principle of fairness should not be violated. 
Only then interactive policy-making is likely to enhance input-oriented 
legitimacy.   
 
Competence and legitimacy on the output side 
The second criterion for an ‘ideal’ interactive process is competence,  
which is the ability to use language to create understanding and agreement. In 
terms of interactive policy-making this principle refers to the extent that 
participants in interactive policy-processes are able to generate effective 
policy-outcomes, were (all) stakeholders agree upon. Therefore the notion of 
competence is linked to the instrumental arguments sustaining the rise of 
interactive policy-making, which focus on legitimacy on the output side. If 
interactive processes want to produce better policy-outcomes, the principle of 
competence should not be violated. This requires that people enter into a 
discourse with an attitude oriented toward reaching understanding. People 
must be committed to reflecting on their personal beliefs, values preferences, 
and interests, they must be open to alternative definitions of reality, and they 
must listen to other people’s arguments with an open mind (Webler, 1995).  
Furthermore the principle of competence requires the interactive process is 
organised in such a manner that participants can cooperate as effectively as 
possible. Therefore rules must be formulated to structure and coordinate the 
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interactions between the different actors (see Barnes, 1996; 2002; Denters and 
Klok, 2003). According to Driessen c.s. (1996) structuring the communication 
process should be the core aspect of managing interactive policy-making. This 
means that interactions between several stakeholders should be guided as 
efficiently as possible. Therefore Driessen c.s. (1996) propose to select the 
participants very carefully. According to them only those stakeholders who are 
indispensable for a successful policy implementation should be selected to 
participate. These might be stakeholders that are involved because they have a 
specific knowledge about the topic which is at stake, for example an architect 
in an interactive process dealing with the restructuring of an area. A second 
group with specific knowledge could be citizens, for example because they live 
in the area where an interactive process is about. As noticed earlier in this 
paper citizens are also involved to prevent them from active resistance, and 
this may be considered indispensable in the process. If the preferences of these 
people, who are considered to be indispensable, are taken into account in the 
final policy, the chance increases that stakeholders will recognize their 
arguments and might reach their goals (Potman, 1989, Hoekema e.a. 1998). 
This might reduce resistance and create support for the policy. In other words 
output legitimacy will be the result.     
 
Fairness and competence: an unresolved dilemma 
The two principles of an ideal interactive process seem to be rather conflictual. 
The notion of fairness states that all stakeholders should have an equal chance 
to influence the outcome of the interactive process, whereas the principle of 
competence holds that that only those actors should be involved who may 
make a significant contribution to the policy process, or who may frustrate the 
process if they are not involved.  
Furthermore, a fair interactive process requires that the group of participants is 
representative to the total population of stakeholders. This may result in large 
deliberative forums in which many actors with conflicting preferences 
participate. The presence of so many conflicting preferences may make it 
impossible to come to an agreement between the participants. For this reason it 
may be preferred to formulate policy within small groups, in which it is easier 
to reach consensus or come to an agreement. In others words: the principle of 
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competence requires the participation of well skilled actors within small 
groups. For this reason an unresolved dilemma exists between the principles of 
fairness and competence (see also Blaug, 1996; Berveling, 1998).  
 
4. A trade-off: fairness or competence? 
 
If there is a dilemma between fairness and competence, the question raises 
how this dilemma can be resolved. Remarkably enough, few attempts have 
been made to provide an answer to this question (for an exception see Webler, 
1995). Until now most scholars have merely focused on just one of the two 
principles, either fairness or competence. In this sense deliberative democrats 
usually focus on the fairness of the debate, whereas the literature on policy 
networks tends to be primarily concerned with providing guidelines for an 
efficient, or competent interactive process. An explanation for this division 
could be found in the assumptions on legitimacy both groups use. Deliberative 
democrats seem to be primarily concerned with input oriented legitimacy, 
whereas the literature on policy networks (implicitly) focuses on legitimacy on 
the output side.  
 
As was outlined above, deliberative democrats seem to be focused on the 
fairness of interactive processes, as they see equal participation as an important 
– or even the most important – source of legitimacy. However, deliberative 
procedures contribute to equal participation only to the extent they meet the 
criterion of inclusiveness; the total population of stakeholders should be 
represented in the deliberative forum (see for example Barnes, 1999; 2002; 
Elster, 1998; Akkerman, 2001). The opportunities to take part in interactive 
processes are in many cases equal, but empirical data show that participants in 
deliberative forums are usually high-educated men, whereas women, 
ethnographic minorities or citizens with low incomes are overwhelmingly 
underrepresented (see Mansbridge, 1983; Hooghe, 1999;  
Edelenbos and Monnikhof, 1998). The same distinction between equal chances 
to particpate and actual participantion must be made concerning other forms of 
participation, for example voting. Following this line of reasoning the question 
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can be asked whether the government only should provide equal opportunities 
to participate, or to ensure that participation is actually equal.   
Furthermore a remark must be made that open procedures alone do not 
automatically lead to equal participation (see Verba, Scholzman and Brady, 
1995) and not all participants share the same level of deliberative skills 
(Stokman, 2003; Sanders, 1997; Hartman, 1998). In this light Hartman (1998) 
argues that more deliberation creates more inequalities, because it works in the 
advantage of the already privileged citizens. For this reason it is difficult to 
defend the claim that the introduction of interactive governance is likely to 
increase legitimacy on the input side, as the idea of fair debates in which 
stakeholders have an equal chance for influencing policy decisions seems to be 
an utopian ideal.               
In addition to this, Blaug (1996) states that we simply have to accept that no 
form of deliberative democracy is free from inequalities in the distribution of 
influence within processes of political deliberation. In fact, he raises questions 
considering the use of the attempts to incorporate a full degree of equality into 
political deliberation. According to him citizens do not necessarily oppose 
deliberative processes in which influence is not equally distributed among all 
participants and non-participants. No, what citizens truly want is deliberative 
processes to be effective, which means that these processes should contribute 
to solving pressing social problems and create policy which is in line with their 
own preferences. Because citizens want the process to be effective in terms of 
solving social problems and reaching their goals, Blaug believes that citizens 
accept that a trade-off is being made between competence (i.e. effectiveness) 
and fairness (i.e. equality). In this respect the strict interpretation of fairness 
should be relativized, and should be put more into line with the preferences 
and goals of citizens. Citizens do not necessarily stress the importance of a full 
degree of fairness. On the contrary: if interactive processes completely live up 
to the ideal of fairness, but are not capable of producing effective outcomes, 
citizens may become disappointed or even frustrated. In the words of Wille 
(2001: 91): ‘Citizens do not want to be a part of just a ritual’.       
In addition to this Benou and Hendriks (1996) remark that if the group of 
participants becomes too large, the transparency of the interaction process 
declines, and as a consequence, the chance that the preferences of all 
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participants will be heard and taken into account may be reduced. In this 
respect a paradox occurs: The notion of fairness is to be seen as a procedure to 
translate citizens’ preferences into political decisions, which is necessary to 
enhance legitimacy on the input side. However, too much fairness limits the 
possibilities for participants to effectively influence decision-making, and thus 
makes it more difficult to link their preferences to decisions. Interactive policy-  
making then becomes nothing more than an empty ritual. In that respect 
fairness is both a necessary condition as well as a threat for input-oriented 
legitimacy.   
 
5. Interaction and legitimacy 
 
If fairness in interactive policy processes is a utopian ideal, and a trade-off 
between the principles of fairness and competence is a necessary evil, does this 
mean that interaction can hardly be seen as a source for democratic legitimacy?  
It may be appealing to answer this question positively. Fairness in the 
interactive process refers to such democratic values as inclusiveness and 
equality, and may therefore be seen as an important – but also a ‘dangerous’ - 
source for arriving legitimacy on the input side. However such an observation 
fails to see that input-oriented legitimacy is not the only form of democratic 
legitimacy and that input oriented legitimacy is not only about these 
democratic values, but also about the opinions, which citizens have about the 
process. To a certain extent they will also stress these democratic values, but 
citizens also take other issues into account. This is the point where the 
relationship between input- and output legitimacy shows up; citizens want to 
reach their goals (output legitimacy) and are therefore willing to sacrifice some 
democratic values.   
In this light Hanberger (2003) states that legitimacy is a ‘product of satisfying 
felt needs and solving perceived problems’. Legitimacy, then, is not only 
achieved to the extent that democratic institutions meet the principle of 
fairness, but to the extent these institutions are able to produce effective 
outcomes. According to Hanberger the ‘crisis’ in legitimacy can be explained 
by the failure of democratic institutions to respond to pressing problems. 
According to him, legitimacy increases through ‘problem oriented’ and 
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‘problem effective’ policies (Hanberger, 2003: 270). In other words he stresses 
that output-oriented legitimacy, rather than legitimacy on the input side, is 
increasingly becoming important.  
Easton’s distinction between ‘specific’ and ‘diffuse’ support may be helpful to 
explain why the importance of output-oriented legitimacy is increasingly being 
stressed in the literature (see for example Dalton, 1999).  Easton describes 
diffuse support as a deep-seated set of attitudes towards politics and the 
operation of a political system that is relatively impervious to change. It is this 
type of support which is often used for measuring the legitimacy of political 
institutions. To put it differently: diffuse support may be seen as an indication 
of legitimacy on the input side. 
The other type of support Easton distinguishes, specific support, is related to 
the performance of the government, and may function as an indication for 
output-oriented legitimacy.  
According to Dalton (1999: 59), a democratic political system requires a 
reservoir of diffuse support independent of immediate policy outputs. 
Dissatisfaction within the citizenry with the performance of the ruling elites is 
not necessarily a signal of eroding legitimacy, just as long as there is support 
for the procedures by which decisions are reached. This changes when 
negative attitudes toward government performance become structural, and 
democratic institutions are not able any more to produce desired outcomes. In 
such a situation the lack of specific support may result in a declining diffuse 
support. A structural lack of legitimacy on the output side may therefore have 
severe implications for input-oriented legitimacy. In addition to this 
Hoogerwerf (1993)2 argues that democratic procedures alone are no longer 
sufficient to enhance democratic legitimacy, as government performance is 
increasingly becoming the most important source for legitimacy. Also the  
Dutch Social and Cultural Planning Office (SCP, 2002, p.213) stresses that the 
                                                 
2 Hoogerwerf distinguishes three sources of legitimacy. According to him legitimacy may arrive from a 
shared ideology (ideological legitimacy); the degree to which decision-making procedures are 
democratic (procedural legitimacy); and effective government performance (task- legitimacy). Due to 
processes of ongoing individualisation, ideological legitimacy is losing its importance. Furthermore, 
citizens would no longer regard democratic institutions as a safe yard for decent decision-making. 
Therefore the quality of government performance is becoming the most important source for 
legitimacy.     
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performance of the government is increasingly becoming the most important 
base of people’s judgement about their government.   
 
If output-oriented legitimacy is becoming more important, interaction in 
policy-making might be an important source for democratic legitimacy to the 
extent that interactive procedures are able to produce effective outcomes that 
satisfy the preferences of citizens. If the principle of fairness is stressed, 
effective outcomes might not be realised. On the other hand a  ‘good’ 
procedure is needed to come to an effective result: stakeholders want to have 
the chance to participate and want to have a certain influence on the outcomes.  
This all means that a certain trade-off between fairness and competence is 
inevitable. Fairness in terms of representation and equality can only be realised 
if every stakeholder is given the opportunity to participate. As we have stated 
before a full degree of fairness is not only a utopian ideal, but may also be 
counterproductive, as more equality will decrease the chances of individuals to 
effectively influence decision-making. However the possibility exists that the 
preferences of those who choose not to participate or those who do not succeed 
in formulating their wishes might be forgotten. However the remark must me 
made that issues of interactive processes are mainly on relatively small issues 
on the local level. In most of these cases final decision-making is left in the 
hands of the city councillors. Of course these councillors should also take into 
account the preferences of the stakeholders who were not represented in the 
interactive process. In this respect fair interaction procedures are not the only 
way to enhance legitimacy on the input side, because also councillors have a 
responsibility in making fair decisions.  
However the point that we would like to emphasise here is that fairness should 
not be the leading principle in managing interactive policy-making. These 
processes usually focus on relatively small local problems that directly affect 
the lives of the citizens involved. These citizens put more value in effective 
solutions to these problems than in the fairness of the procedure by which 
these solutions were formulated. If the notion of fairness dominates the notion 
of competence, effective solutions might not be reached, and makes it 
impossible to reach legitimacy on the output side.   
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 6. Conclusion 
 
In this contribution the question was raised to what extent the rise of 
interactive governance might increase legitimacy. Following Scharpf, 
legitimacy was described as a two dimensional concept, which refers to both 
the inputs as well as the outputs of a political system. In order to make a 
contribution to legitimacy on the input side, processes of interactive 
governance should meet the principle of fairness, which means that all 
stakeholders should have equal opportunities to influence the outcomes of the 
interactive process. Furthermore, interactive policy-making could increase 
output-oriented legitimacy, when the interactive process meets the criterion of 
competence. This principle holds that the interactive process should be 
organised in such a manner that effective outcomes can be reached. 
Competence requires the participation of a selective group of high skilled 
actors.  
The principles of fairness and competence pose different, rather conflictual, 
demands on the organisation of the interactive process. As a consequence, 
managing interactive policy processes involves setting priorities, which means 
a trade-off must be made between both principles of fairness and competence. 
There are several reasons why more weight should be put on the criterion of 
competence, rather than fairness. The first argument is pragmatic by nature. 
Empirical research has often shown that striving for interactive processes that 
are completely fair is a fruitless effort. In practice no single interactive process 
is free from inequalities in the distribution of influence. To put it even 
stronger: empirical data show that usually well-equipped citizens are able to 
influence the decisions made in interactive processes. Even when the 
possibilities to gain access to these processes are distributed equally among all 
stakeholders, interactive governance is more likely to create new inequalities 
rather than reducing them. In this respect the claim that the rise of interactive 
governance is likely to increase legitimacy on the input side in terms of these 
democratic values is difficult to sustain. However, we should emphasise here 
once more that citizens might be satisfied with the procedures of interactive 
 17
governance, even if these procedures do not contain a full degree of fairness. 
In this respect fairness – just like beauty – lies in the eyes of the beholder. 
However, the claim that the introduction of interactive governance must be 
seen as an effort to enhance legitimacy on the input side is based on a romantic 
but outdated idea of citizen participation. The opportunities for interactive 
governance to increase legitimacy lay not on the input but on the output side of 
the political system.  
Emphasising possibilities to increase legitimacy on the output side could be 
seen as a pragmatic way to gain legitimacy, and fits in the individualised 
society in which citizens ask for policy effectiveness. As a consequence, not 
fairness, but competence should be the leading principle in managing 
interactive policy processes. This does not mean, however, that the principle of 
fairness should be completely ignored, as a certain degree of fairness is 
necessary to formulate effective policy in which the preferences of 
stakeholders are translated. In this respect input and output legitimacy 
complement rather than compete each other.  
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